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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING
CENTER, INC.,
Plaintiff,

v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH and FRANK S. WARNER and
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioners,
and UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY,

Case No. 14568

Defendants,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case originated in a proceeding before the Public
Service Commission of Utah wherein the plaintiff, Cottonwood Mall
Shopping Center, Inc., filed an application seeking a certificate
of convenience and necessity to operate as a public utility
supplying electric service to its shopping center and to the
individual offices and stores located therein, or, in the alternative, for a finding by the Commission that such proposed service
would be exempt from application of the public utility laws of
this state and would not be subject to regulation by the Commission.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
A motion to dismiss the application was filed by defendant Utah Power & Light Company, a duly certificated supplier of
electric service in Salt Lake County and the present supplier of
all electric service to plaintiff's shopping center and the
stores and offices located therein.

Said motion was heard by the

Commission on February 24, 1976, and the Commission, by its order
dated March 10, 1976, granted same with respect only to the
alternative prayer of the application which seeks a determination
that the proposed service would not be subject to regulation.
The Commission did not grant or deny the motion to dismiss with
respect to the remaining prayer of the application which seeks
the grant to applicant of a certificate of convenience and necessity
to operate as a public utility, and ruling on that issue was
deferred.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for rehearing and

reconsideration and same was denied by the Commission by its
order dated April 15, 1976.

Plaintiff thereupon sought this review.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's order
which granted defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to that
portion of plaintiff's application which sought a determination
by the Commission that plaintiff's proposed supplying of electric
service would be exempt from regulation by the Commission.

- 3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's brief contains almost six pages of gratuitous recitations, comments, explanations, assertions and
theories under the index heading ''Statement of Fact.11

Defendant

does not agree with such statement or any portion thereof.

There

are no facts to be submitted for the Court's review in this case.
This proceeding is based solely on an order of the Commission
issued after argument of a motion to dismiss.

The hearing on

said motion involved only arguments by counsel.

No testimony was

presented and no exhibits were offered or received in evidence.
There have been no proceedings in the matter other than the
aforesaid argument of this defendant's motion to dismiss, and
there is no evidence whatever appearing in the record of this
case before the Commission.

The status of the case was clearly

explained on the record by the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission when, near the end of the hearing, he stated as
follows:
I might just say so the record is clear that
these allegations of fact made by either
party really have no force or effect on the
Commission's ruling in this matter because
this is not a fact hearing. Nobody's attempted
to present any evidence. This is simply an
argument of law and the Commission is only
looking at the law in determining how to rule
in this matter. (Transcript, p. 34)

- 4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH CORRECTLY HELD THAT
A RULING OF THE FEDERAL COURT IN AN ACTION INVOLVING THE
SAME PARTIES AND THE SAME ISSUES AS INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT
PROCEEDING IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
The pending case before the Court represents another
phase of a long-standing controversy between the parties.

Such

controversy has involved various actions and proceedings before
state and federal courts and the legislature of the state of
Utah.
In 1968 the plaintiff herein filed an action against
this defendant in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah (Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light
Company, Civil No. 229-68).

Such action, based on an alleged

violation of federal anti-trust laws, contended that the defendant
herein conspired to supress and eliminate competition from the
plaintiff by various alleged actions designed to prevent plaintiff
from operating its power plant and supplying electric service to
defendant's present customers and prospective customers located
in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center.

Defendant filed a motion

to dismiss said action and on July 11, 1969, the court issued its
decree which granted summary judgment against plaintiff and dismissed the complaint with prejudice and on its merits.

The

findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of the United

- 5-

States District Court are set forth in full in the appendix
hereto.
An inherent issue in the federal court case was whether
or not the plaintiff was entitled, under the laws of the state
of Utah, to furnish electrical power to the Cottonwood Mall
Shopping Center without having first acquired a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, as required by statute, permitting
it to supply such service as a public utility.

In that regard,

the court found and concluded that plaintiff was not so entitled
and that if plaintiff was permitted to generate and distribute
electric energy, as it proposed to do, it would be an "electrical
corporation11 and "public utility" as defined in §54-2-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and could not legally construct
or operate an electrical system without first securing a certificate of public convenience and necessity as required by §54-425(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Such determination

relates to the same issue subsequently presented in the instant
proceeding to the Public Service Commission; that is, whether or
not under Utah law the plaintiff1s proposed supplying of electric
service would be exempt from application of the statefs public
utility laws and therefore exempt from regulation by the Commission.

The Commission, by its order, held that such issue had

already been specifically determined by a court of law and therefore refused to further consider same and granted defendant's
motion to dismiss as same related to that issue.

- 6-

The decision of the federal district court was appealed
by plaintiff to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, and that court, in a decision issued on March 12, 1971
(440 F.2d 36), fully considered the applicable Utah statutes and
cases and affirmed the federal district court decision.

At this

point, then, a federal district court and a federal court of
appeals had both determined that plaintiff's proposed supplying
of electric service would not be exempt from application of the
state's public utility laws and the regulation attendant thereto.
Plaintiff then sought to have the matter further
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court and on October 12,
1971, plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.
(30 L.Ed 2d 99).
The order of the Public Service Commission (R. 123) was
based on the doctrine of res judicata in that the issue presented
by plaintiff to the Commission had been specifically reviewed and
determined by a court of law in a prior action involving the same
parties and the same issues, among others, as are involved in the
instant action.
The doctrine of res judicata is well established in
Utah and has been repeatedly recognized and applied by this Court
as in, for instance, Mathews v. Mathews, 132 P.2d 111 (Utah,
1942), where the Court quoted at length from Ruling Case Law as
follows:
The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate

- 7the same issue more than once; that, when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, so long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties, and those in privity with
them in law or estate. * * * Public policy
and the interest of litigants alike require
that there be an end to litigation, and the
peace and order of society demand that matters
distinctly put in issue and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction as to parties
and subject matter shall not be retried
between the same parties in any subsequent
suit in any court. 15 R.C.L. 953, Sec. 430.
The applicability of the doctrine is unaffected by the
fact that the initial proceeding was before a federal court and
the subsequent proceeding was before a state administrative
agency.

While there does not appear to be a Utah precedent on

the subject, it is well established that a determination in a
federal action may be res judicata in a subsequent state action.
The following cases have so held:

Harrell vt Rockett (La. 1953),

65 So.2d 670, King v. Grindstaff (N.C. 1973), 200 SE 2d 799,
Ham v. Holy Rosary Hospital (Mont. 1974), 529 P.2d 361, Robinson
v. Brown (Ala. 1976), 328 So.2d 291, Chamberlin of Pittsburgh v.
Fort Pitt Chemical Co. (Pa. 1976), 352 A.2d 176.
The Ham v. Holy Rosary Hospital ca^e, supra, is a 1974
Montana decision that, while factually different, is very similar
to the instant case in its procedural aspects.

That case involved

a suit filed in federal district court in Montana seeking an
order compelling the hospital to permit a doctor to perform a
surgical sterilization.

The court dismissed the same and in its

- 8opinion made certain findings on constitutional issues.

Plaintiffs

then filed a complaint in state district court seeking the same
relief and raising the same constitutional issues.

The state

district court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss on the
basis of res judicata and on appeal the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed and held that the federal court's determination of the
subject constitutional issues was conclusive and such determination
by the federal court was res judicata in the state action.
While it may be argued that res judicata is not applicable here because the two actions involved were based on different
claims for relief, the doctrine nevertheless applies insofar as
the same specific issues were involved in both actions.
2d, Judgments, Section 415.
305 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1957).

46 Am. Jur.

H. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Company,
A specific issue in both the federal

court and Public Service Commission proceedings was whether or
not plaintiff's proposed supplying of electric service was exempt
from application of the state's public utility laws.
Further, the rule of res judicata applies to all judicial
determinations whether made in actions or in special or summmary
proceedings.

Braine v. Stroud, 385 P.2d 428 (Oklahoma). Appli-

cation of the doctrine is not dependent on the form of litigation
in which the adjudication was made.

The rule is well stated in

46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 467, as follows:
It is also worthy of notice that, with respect
to the preclusion of the relitigation of
identical issues in a subsequent action
between the same parties, or their privies,
it is immaterial that the two actions have a

- 9different scope, involve different forms of a
proceeding, are based on different grounds,
are tried on different theories, ate instituted
for different purposes, or seek different
relief.
This court, in a quiet title action involving mining
claims (H. Knight v. Flat Top Mining Company, supra) found that
certain issues with respect to such claims had been determined in
a prior action and were therefore binding even though one of the
parties to the second action was not a party to the prior action
but was a successor in interest to one of sucth prior parties.
The court quoted with approval from 30 Am. Jur., Judgments,
Section 920, as follows:
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence
that material facts or questions which were
in issue in a former action, and were there
admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein,
and that such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a
subsequent action between the same parties or
their privies, regardless of the form the
issue may take in a subsequent action, * * *
Plaintiff!s brief indicates that the federal court
decision of the prior litigation between the parties was made
without the hearing of any evidence.

While such decision was

made pursuant to defendant's motion and summary judgment granted
thereon, it should be noted that the decree (Appendix, A-5)
specifically states that depositions, affidavits and memoranda of
law were received and same were examined by the court.
Plaintiff's brief, in Point I of the Argument thereof,
contends that the Commission was in error in applying res judicata,

- 10 especially "since some of the facts upon which the ruling was
based have changed."

Plaintifffs argument in Point I then pro-

ceeds to recite certain "facts" with reference to changes of
ownership of certain property located within the shopping center.
Such recitation is purely gratuitous inasmuch as nc) evidence
whatever has at this stage of the proceeding been presented to or
received by the Commission.

As the record indicates, this appeal

was taken following a ruling and order on defendants motion to
dismiss.

The hearing consisted only of oral arguments by counsel

and submission by plaintiff of a document entitled "Argument on
Petition to Find Applicant a Nonutility and Answer to Protestant's Motion to Dismiss."

No witnesses have testified in the

proceedings thus far, and no depositions, affidavits, exhibits or
other evidence has been presented.

Accordingly, no new evidence

has been submitted for consideration by the Commission by this
Court, and the only evidence that has. been submitted in the
long-standing controversy between the parties was duly considered
and a determination made thereon by a court of law in the prior
federal court action.
Plaintiff's brief cites Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 31 L.Ed. 2d 131, as a United States Supreme Court case
which completely overrules the decision in Cottonwood Mall Shopping
Center v. Utah Power & Light Company, supra.

That case deals

with the denial by a shopping center of a right to distribute
within the center handbills protesting the draft and the Viet Nam
war.

It was held in a five to four decision that there had been

-lino dedication of the Mall property to public use so as to permit
the distribution therein of handbills unrelated to the shopping
center operations and such denial, therefore, did not constitute
a violation of constitutional safeguards of the right of free
speech.
The Lloyd case is vastly different from the instant
proceeding both from a factual standpoint and in the very nature
of the controversy involved and certainly cannot be regarded as a
precedent applicable to the case now before the Court.

At the

outset, an essential element set forth in the Supreme Court
decision in Lloyd was that the claimed First Amendment rights of
those desiring to distribute handbills were totally unrelated to
the shopping center's operations and had no Relation to any
purpose for which the center was built and b^ing used.

The

narrow scope of the Lloyd case holding would be unduly broadened
if, as plaintiff contends, such holding should be extended to
include the present situation involving the supply of a state
regulated public service to the shopping center and its lessees
and tenants.

Such circumstance is clearly related to the shopping

center!s operation and to the purpose for which it was built and
is being used.

An equally important distinction is apparent in

that in the Lloyd case there were no state statutes bearing upon
the respective rights of the parties while in the instant proceeding such rights are clearly dependent upon the application
and interpretation of this state's public utility laws.

- 12 In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the
decision in the Lloyd case is clearly not applicable to the
present controversy before the Court and offers no escape from
application of the doctrine of res judicata to the issue upon
which this appeal is based.

POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SUPPLYING OF
ELECTRIC SERVICE WOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM
APPLICATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
While the Court, at this stage of the proceeding,
does not have the benefit of reviewing any evidence bearing on
this controversy, an examination of applicable statutes, as
applied to issues raised by the pleadings, clearly confirms that
the subject Public Service Commission order correctly determined,
irrespective of res judicata, that plaintifffs proposed supply of
electric service vrould not be exempt from regulation.
The law relative to regulation of public utilities in
this state has been well defined during the long period of time
since creation of the Public Service Commission in 1917. During
that extended period there have been few changes in the law
regarding jurisdiction of the Commission over electric utilities.
This area of the law, therefore, has been basically unchanged,
for a period of almost sixty years, during which time fundamental
regulatory concepts in the state of Utah have become well established

- 13 Although plaintifffs brief comments at length regarding
the pro-free enterprise and anti-regulation attitudes of the framers
of the state's constitution, the inescapable fact remains that
subsequent legislatures have, in the public interest, adopted a
policy of governmental regulation in many areas and have established
and continue to establish broad layers of state regulation of a
variety of business, individual and public pursuits.

Such regulation

and the need for same is well established in the area of public
utilities.

This Court's recognition of the regulatory structure

in Utah is apparent in many cases, and a particularly exhaustive
analysis of "public convenience and necessity1' was made in Mulcahy
v. Public Service Commission, 117 P.2d 298 (Utah, 1941).
The basic purpose and intent of the public utility laws
that were adopted by Utah and its sister states early in this
century were clearly and succinctly stated in the case of Idaho
Power & Light Company v. Blomquist, 141 P. 10^3, as follows:
The general impression has been that competition was supposed to be a legitimate and
proper means of protecting the interests of
the public and promoting the general welfare
of the people in respect to service by public
utility corporations; but history and experience
has clearly demonstrated that public convenience
and the necessities of the community do not
require the construction and maintenance of
several plants or systems of the same character
to supply a city of the same locality, but that
public convenience and necessity require only
the maintenance of a sufficient number of
such instrumentalities to meet the public
demands. If more than one instrumentality is
to be sustained when one is amply sufficient,
the actual cost to the public served is not
only necessarily greater than it would be
under one system, but also less convenient.
If public convenience and necessity do not

- 14 demand a duplication of power systems, why
should the public be burdened with the expense
of maintaining such duplicate systems, and
the annoyance of perpetual solicitation to
make or break contracts for service, and the
inconvenience to the people of the occupation
of the streets and alleys of a town or city
by such corporations in constructing and
keeping in repair the two systems?
The public utilities act merely declares the
will of the people, as expressed through the
Legislature, to the effect that competition
between public utility corporations of the
classes specified shall be allowed only where
public convenience and necessity demand it,
and in any case the commission is thereby
given power to fix the rates to be charged,
which cannot be varied by such corporations.
The Legislature has concluded by the passage
of said act that it is not for the best
interests of the people or the public welfare
to permit public utility corporations to
compete with each other where public convenience and necessity do not require such
competition. * * *
The Utah Code defines the term "electrical corporation'1
and then defines "public utility" as including an "electrical
corporation" and declares that any such public utility is subject
to regulation by the Commission under §54-2-1(30), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Initially, therefore, a deter-

mination must be made as to whether or not the plaintiff by
providing its proposed electric service would be an "electrical
corporation" and, as such, a "public utility".

Section 54-2-

1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, defines electrical
corporation as follows:
(20) The term "electrical corporation"
includes every corporation, cooperative
association and person, their lessees,
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,

- 15 operating or managing any electric plant, or
in anywise furnishing electrical power, for
public service or to its consumers or members
for domestic, commercial or industrial use,
within this state except where electricity is
generated on or distributed by the producer
through private property alone, i.e,, property
not dedicated to public use, solely for his
own use, or the use of his tenants, or by an
association of unit owners under the "condominium
ownership act,M chapter 11, Laws of Utah,
1963 (57-8-1 to 57-8-35), and not for sale to
others.
The only significant changes in the above section since enactment
in 1917 were 1965 amendments that included cooperative associations within the definition of electrical corporation and created
an exemption from the definition for associations of condominium
unit owners.

It is noted that to be an "electrical corporation,"

an entity need not sell electric power, it neqd only furnish
same, and further, it need not be furnished to the general public
but only to "consumers."

Since plaintiff proposes to operate an

electric plant and furnish electric power to consumers for
commercial use, plaintiff clearly falls within the basic definition of an electrical corporation as set forth in the statute.
Therefore, unless plaintiff can come within the recognized
exception to that definition, plaintiff cannot provide the
proposed service to defendantfs customers in the Cottonwood Mall
without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity.
The key phrase of the foregoing definition of electrical corporation upon which plaintiff relies for its claimed exempt status
is ". . . except where electricity is generated on or distributed by
the producer through private property above, i.e., property not

- 16 dedicated to public use, solely for his own use or use of his
tenants, . . .If
In order to uphold plaintiff's contention, the broad
assumption must be made that the Utah Legislature in 1917 intended
to exempt an electrical power production and distribution operation on the scale contemplated by plaintiff.
would be unwarranted and unjustifiable.
were unknown in 1917.

Such an assumption

Suburban shopping malls

Condominium ownership was likewise unknown

at that time, but the Legislature in 1965 appropriately amended
the statute to provide for same.

No such amendment has been

enacted with reference to shopping malls and in this regard the
1917 language remains intact.

A reasonable construction of such

language, considering the date of enactment of the statute, is
that the Legislature intended to exempt service to certain types
of facilities then existing, such as apartment and office buildings,
from application of the statute.

It does not appear reasonable

to assume that the 1917 Legislature intended the "tenant11 exemption to apply to a large multi-building complex of some seventy
retail stores and offices encompassed in a facility that conducts
not only general retail merchandising but also engages in a wide
variety of nonmerchandising civic and social activities open to
the public without charge.

The nature of these activities are

set forth in the Tenth Circuit Court opinion in Cottonwood Mall
Shopping Center v. Utah Power & Light Company, supra, where at
440 F.2d page 39 the Court states:

- 17 In the past the Board (of Cottonwood Mall
Merchants* Association) has authorized a
whole gamut of activities including automobile shows, small car races, sidewalk
sales, garden shows, boat shows, stamp shows,
Indian dances, a circus, art displays, and
handicraft shows. Also, the auditorium at
the Center has been used by many religious,
civic, social and political groups to hold
gatherings, dances, and the like, a large
number of which took place after stbre
closing hours.
A footnote to the foreoging excerpt states that nCottonwood?s
brief gives a more complete list" and then sets forth a long list
of activities similar to those enumerated in the Court!s opinion.
It is clear from the nature of the shopping mall operation that
the electrical power proposed to be there generated and distributed
would not be used solely by the mall owner and its tenants, which
sole use is essential for application of the exemption upon which
plaintiff relies.
Defendant's contention that the 1917 Legislature did
not contemplate an exemption for the electric service proposed to
be supplied by plaintiff, particularly since the type of facility
for which such service is contemplated was then unknown, appears
fully warranted in view of amendments that have been made to the
definition of "electrical corporation.,!

Prior to 1965, the

condominium form of ownership was not a factor that required
legislative attention with regard to utility service.

Such was

also the case with regard to electrical servic^ being supplied by
a cooperative association to its members, and this Court held in
Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 100 P.2d 571, that

- 18 such

organizations were not subject to the jurisdiction of the

Commission.

As circumstances changed with regard to condominiums

and cooperative associations, and with the inability of the
existing statute to accommodate such changes, the Legislature
enacted amendments for that purpose.

In 1965 the narrow exceptions

from the definition of "electrical corporation11 were broadened to
include an association of condominium owners, and the entities to
be included in the definition were expanded to include cooperative
associations.

Further, where the former statute termed "electrical

corporation" as one who furnished electrical power for public
service, the 1965 amendment added language to include also one
who furnishes electric power to its "consumers or members for
domestic, commercial or industrial use." The Legislature obviously
intended by such amendments (1) to expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission to provide that any organization, other than those
specifically exempted, supplying electric power for public service
or for use by consumers and members would be an "electrical
corporation" and as such subject to regulation as a public utility
by the Public Service Commission, and (2) to provide a specific
exemption for electric service supplied to a new form of property
ownership, which exemption was not covered by the language of the
narrow existing exception to those entities classified as "electrical
corporations."
Construing the reach of §54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended ("electrical corporation" definition) broadly,
and strictly limiting the scope of the exeptions thereto, would
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regulation and the intent of the Legislature as manifest by the
history of the statute.

Such an interpretation would also be

consistent with the well established rule of statutory construction
enunciated by the court in Bird & Jex Co., et ai. , v. Funk, et al.,
85 P.2d 831, 96 Utah 450 (1939), that:
A proviso which operates to limit the application of the provisions of a statute, general
in their terms, should be strictly construed
to include no case not within the letter of
the proviso.
or as stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Broadliurst Foundation
v. New Hope Baptist Society, 397 P.2d 360 (Kansas, 1964):
. . . The statutes must, of course, be construed in their entirety with a view of
giving effect to the legislative intent. It
must be remembered that ordinarily a strict
or narrow interpretation is applied to
statutory exceptions. (50 Am. Jur., Statutes,
Section 431, p. 451). In construing a
statute, any doubt should be resolved against
the exception, and anyone claiming to be
relieved from the statute!s operation must
establish that he comes within the Exception.
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, §299, p.
610).
The intent of the Legislature, with respect to the
subject statute, appears clear.

Having amended the statute in

two respects relative to new or changed conditions (condominiums
and cooperative associations) which have occurred or developed
since enactment of the statute, and the absence of any similar
action with respect to another new condition (suburban shopping
centers) would indicate the intention to retain and preserve a
broad category of electric suppliers classified as "electrical

- 20 cooperatives1' and to strictly limit those suppliers excepted from
such classification.

CONCLUSION
The Public Service Commission of Utah, by its order
dated March 10, 1976, correctly determined, under Utah law, that
defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted insofar as it
related to the alternative prayer of plaintiff's application
seeking a determination by the Commission that the electric
service proposed to be supplied by plaintiff would not be subject
to regulation by the Commission, and the Commission's order
dismissing that portion of the application should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
ROBERT GORDON
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Power & Light Company
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Brief of Defendant Utah Power & Light
Company was served this
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day of August, 1976, by mailing

copies of same, postage prepaid, to Keith E. Sohm, Attorney for
Plaintiff, Suite #81, Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102,
and to G. Blaine Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for
the Division of Public Utilities, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
--0O0

COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING CENTER :
INC., a Utah corporation,
:
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Maine corporation,
Defendant.

\
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
:

Civil No. C-229-68

:
0O0

Defendantfs motion to dismiss came on for hearing the
8th day of May, 1969, before the Honorable Willis W. Ritter,
Chief Judge. Plaintiff and third party defendants were represented
by Brigham E. Roberts of the firm of Rawlings, Roberts & Black;
the defendant was represented by Marvin J. Bertoch and Thomas A.
Quinn of the firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and by Sidney G.
Baucom and Robert Gordon of the firm of Baucom, Gordon & Porter.
Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law were presented and not excluded, and arguments were made by counsel.
Having examined the depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law
and listened to the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiff owns a shopping center in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and with the exception of an area located
within the center which is owned by Eldredge Furniture Company,
The plaintiff constructed the buildings located in the shopping
center and leases them to approximately seventy different tenants,
and has sold one of the properties to the Eldredge Furniture
Company.
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2. Since 1961, defendant has supplied electrical power
to the tenants and owners occupying the Cottonwood Mall Shopping
Center.
3. Plaintiff in 1968 and 1969 installed a power plant
on the premises, and by this lawsuit seeks to compete with the
defendant in supplying electrical power for use in the shopping
center,
4. Defendant, having expended approximately $558,000.00
in capital investment to supply the center with electricity, is
equipped and able and desires to continue to provide all of the
electrical power needed for present and future use in the shopping
center.
5. The sole issue submitted to this Court by defendant's
motion to dismiss, which the Court under Rule 12(b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, will treat as a motion for summary
judgment, is whether or not the plaintiff has the right under
Title 54, Utah Code Annotated, to compete with the defendant in
the furnishing of electrical power in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping
Center.
6. The Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center consists of
approximately seventy stores and offices, which sell merchandise
of various types and supply professional services to thousands of
members of the general public. The stores include such large
department stores as Z.C.M.I and J. C. Penney Company, plus
grocery stores, clothing stores, drug stores, restaurants and
various other types of stores commonly found in a large shopping
center. The premises include a large electrically lighted parking
lot. In addition, numerous persons other than shoppers are
attributed to and use the facilities of the center for such
activities as automobile shows, Junior Achievement fairs, garden
and flower shows, boat shows, Go-Kart shows, stamp shows, Indian
dancers, art and ceramic shows, bazaars, Halloween parades and
other similar activities classified by the manager of the Cottonwood Mall Merchants Association as "traffic building events."
Other activities are routinely allowed on the premises such as
high school seminary dances, dances sponsored by the Latter-day
Saints Church stakes, square dances, firemen's balls and Easter
sunrise services, all of which are carried on when the stores are
not open and are not considered by the manager of the Cottonwood
Mall Merchants Association as "traffic building events."
7. If plaintiff were permitted to furnish electric
power as it proposes to do, it would not be providing electric
power "solely for its own use, or the use of its tenants" in
contemplation of 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
makes the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. 54-2-1(20), 54-2-1(29) (now 54-2-1(30)), and 54-425(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are the controlling statutes.
They read as follows:
Statutes omitted in this Appendix.
54-2-1(20) - Definition of "electrical corporation"
§54-2-1(29) (now §54-2-1(30)) - Definition of "public
utility"
§54-2-25(1) - Requirement for Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity
2. The plaintiff, if permitted to generate and distribute electric power as it proposes to do, would be an "electric
corporation" in contemplation of 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and would be a "public utility" in contemplation of 54-21(29) (now 54-2-1(30)), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and could not
legally construct an electrical plant or system or generate or
distribute electricity without first acquiring a certificate of
public convenience and necessity as required by 54-4-25(1), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
3. Plaintiff has not been
public convenience and necessity and
law to be granted such a certificate
distribution of electricity to serve
Center.

granted & certificate of
is not entitled under the
for the generation or
the Cottonwood Mall Shopping

4. It was not the intention of the Utah Legislature in
adopting 54-2-1(20), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to allow persons
to avoid the supervision and regulation of the Public Service
Commission in connection with supplying electrical service to
large shopping centers. It is a purpose of Utah law involving
public utilities to protect users of electricity with respect to
rates and quality of service. The legislature and the law intend
that such protection be supplied to such users as those occupying
the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center.
5. The defendant is authorized by law to serve the
users of electricity in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center and
is entitled under the law to provide the exclusive electrical
service to all users of electricity in the Cottonwood Mall Shopping
Center, and accordingly is not in violation of any antitrust law
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and not illegally interfering with or violating any of plaintiff's
rights in so doing.
6. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment against
the plaintiff dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and for its
costs incurred herein.
DATED this 11th day of July, 1969.

/s/ Willis W. Ritter
Judge
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
0O0

COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING CENTER
INC., a Utah corporation,
D E C R E E

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-229-68

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Maine corporation,
Defendant.
-oOo-

Defendant's motion to dismiss came on for hearing on
the 8th day of May, 1969, before the Honorable Willis W. Ritter,
Chief Judge. Plaintiff and Third party defendants were represented by Brigham E. Roberts of the firm of Rawlings, Roberts &
Black; the defendant was represented by Marvin J. Bertoch and
Thomas A. Quinn of the firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, and by
Sidney G. Baucom and Robert Gordon.
Depositions, affidavits and memoranda of law were
presented and not excluded, and arguments were made by counsel.
Depositions and affidavits having been received, defendants
motion, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12(b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, will be treated as a motion for summary
judgment and disposed of under the provisions of Rule 56, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court, having examined the depositions, affidavits
and memoranda of law, and having listened to the arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, .
And the Court expressly determined that there is no
just reason for delay, and the Court expressly directs that this
Decree be entered as a final decree pursuant to the terms and
provisions of Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant, Utah Power & Light
Company, be, and is hereby granted summary judgment against
plaintiff, the complaint of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed
with prejudice and on its merits, costs to be paid by the plaintiff.
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Dated this 11th day of July, 1969.

/s/ Willis W. Ritter
Judge

